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NUCLEAR ENERGY IN SWEDEN:
WILL THE NUCLEAR PHASEOUT
FIZZLE OUT?
Andrew J. Racz
Introduction
Sweden has long stood as a beacon of envi-
ronmentalism to Europe and the world. A
nation rich with vast tracts of unspoiled forests
and pristine waterways, it has invested count-
less resources to uphold rigorous environmen-
tal standards which add significantly to its qual-
ity of life. Likewise, Sweden has committed
itself to sound environmental practices on the
global stage. As a signing member of the Kyoto
Protocol to counter the effects of global warm-
ing, the nation has pledged to curb emissions
of greenhouse-causing carbon dioxide gas to
pre-1990 levels; today, Sweden’s consumption
of fossil fuels is one of the lowest in the EU. A
nationwide focus on non-carbon electricity
generation has aided in accomplishing this
goal, as less than seven percent of Sweden’s
electricity is currently provided by carbon-
based fuel sources such as fossil fuels.
(Nordhaus) Hydroelectric and nuclear power
supply the vast majority of the country’s elec-
tricity needs, with each comprising nearly half
of the total production.
Given these statistics, it would appear that
energy issues in Sweden are well under control.
In reality, however, Sweden is currently facing
a complicated energy dilemma. In a national
referendum held in 1980, 76 percent of Swedes
voiced a desire to end the nation’s dependence
on nuclear power. Ever since, Sweden has been
planning to gradually phase out nuclear power
and search for alternative clean energy sources.
Looking back, this decision appears to have
been based largely on social fears, cultural atti-
tudes and political agendas. The referendum
occurred at a time when little was known about
the greenhouse effect of carbon dioxide. The
science and economics of today do little to jus-
tify eliminating an energy source that has, for
nearly four decades, proven to be safe, clean and
economical. Although progress to phase out
nuclear power has thus far consisted of much
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talk and little action, Sweden still appears intent
on an eventual discontinuation of nuclear
power generation. Unfortunately, Sweden’s
search for alternate energy sources, even when
combined with rigorous conservation mea-
sures, has met with only limited success.
Regarding nuclear power’s abundant market
share and an ever-increasing demand for elec-
tricity, no source of renewable energy current-
ly exists in Sweden that can entirely replace the
existing nuclear power capacity. Invariably, a
phasing-out of nuclear power would necessitate
an increased reliance upon fossil fuels. With
global warming now at the forefront of the
world environmental agenda, Sweden must
reexamine its decision. All energy production
carries an environmental consequence: nuclear
power produces radioactive waste and the less
tangible fear of a catastrophic accident, while
the combustion of fossil fuels results in air pol-
lution and global warming. Sweden must now
decide which of these is the lesser of the two
evils.
The implications of Sweden’s ultimate
decision are profound and many. On a nation-
al scale, a transition to a fossil-fuel-based power
supply could increase both industrial and
domestic electricity costs, as well as increase
Sweden’s dependence on foreign energy. An
increasingly integrated European energy mar-
ket means that Sweden’s decision will carry
continent-wide ramifications as well. Globally,
Sweden’s decision could represent a symbolic
step forward or backward in combating global
warming.
History and Growth of Sweden’s
Electric Power Infrastructure
Throughout the first half of the twentieth
century, electricity in Sweden was provided
almost exclusively by hydroelectric power
plants constructed along the nation’s rivers.
The terrain in northern and central Sweden
consists of rolling hills which slope gently from
the mountains along the Norwegian border
westward toward the Baltic Sea. Rivers in this
region flow from west to east and are fed by
storms which carry abundant moisture inland
from the Atlantic Ocean. This ideal natural
combination of terrain and climate made
hydroelectricity an obvious power supply
choice. Not only was power generation inex-
pensive, but harmful environmental effects
such as pollutants or waste were nonexistent. 
By the mid-1950s, Sweden’s hydroelectric
power infrastructure had been expanded to what
is almost its current capacity. Though not all of
Sweden’s river systems had been exploited, it was
decided that the majority of yet-untapped rivers
should remain free-flowing for environmental
reasons. Despite providing clean and renewable
energy, hydroelectric dams hinder fish migra-
tion and disrupt the overall ecological balance of
a river basin. Four major river systems were des-
ignated as protected from further hydroelectric
development. (Lofstedt, p. 1)
It was during the 1950s that Sweden ini-
tiated its nuclear power program. Following the
“Atoms for Peace” conference held in Geneva
in 1955, Sweden decided to use nuclear power
as a means of achieving national self-sufficien-
cy in energy production. Sweden’s first two
nuclear plants, Marviken and Ågesta, were
heavy-water reactors. Due to a combination of
factors, including technical problems, cost
overruns, and the use of low-grade domestic
uranium ores, neither plant was ever success-
ful. Marviken was never put into operation,
while Ågesta never became profitable and was
shut down after just ten years of production.
(Nordhaus, pp. 14-15) 
Nuclear power only became successful in
the mid-1960s, when the safer, more efficient
light-water reactor technology came into use.
The Swedish government collaborated with the
domestic power equipment manufacturer ASEA
and several American companies to implement
the new technology, and in 1972 the first of
Sweden’s modern nuclear power plants was
opened in Oskarshamn. Between 1972 and
1985, a total of twelve nuclear power genera-
tors were constructed: four at the Ringhals
plant, three at Oskarshamn, three at Forsmark,
and two at Bäresback. (Nordhaus, p. 16) Nine
of the twelve units are boiling-water-reactors,
while the remaining three, at Ringhals, are
pressurized cold-water-reactors. Individual
reactor outputs range from 600 to 1200
megawatts for a total power production of 96
terawatt-hours per year (1 tWh = 109 kWh).
(Uranium Information Centre Ltd. [UIC]) 
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Together, nuclear and hydroelectric power
currently account for 93 percent of Sweden’s
total electricity production, with hydroelectric
comprising 48 percent and nuclear 46 percent.
(Bergman, p. 151) Renewable energy sources
such as wind power, solar power and biofuels
provide an additional six percent. Biofuels,
which consist largely of waste wood products
derived from Sweden’s extensive paper and pulp
industry, make up the majority of this catego-
ry. Fossil fuels as a whole provide only a frac-
tion of a percent of Sweden’s total electricity
production.
The extent to which Sweden has decreased
its reliance upon fossil fuels since the 1970s is
truly remarkable, and is likely a direct result of
the advent of nuclear power. Between the years
1955 and 1970, oil consumption for all energy
needs, including electricity, heating and trans-
portation, more than doubled, increasing from
32 to 76 tWh per year. Beginning in 1973, the
year after Sweden’s first nuclear reactors came
online, oil use began to decrease. A reduced
dependence on foreign, largely Middle Eastern,
oil allowed Sweden to ride out the oil shock of
the 1970s with minimal impact. By the mid-
1980s, oil consumption had fallen below 
pre-1955 levels, and in 2001 it accounted for 
a mere 19 tWh per year. (Royal Swedish
Academy...[IVA], p. 55) Most of this oil is con-
sumed by the transportation sector in the form
of petroleum. As a result, oil still represents 
a substantial component of Sweden’s total 
energy budget. In terms of electricity, howev-
er, Sweden’s dependence on fossil fuels has
become almost negligible.
The 1980 Referendum
The nuclear power program in Sweden
had barely gotten off the ground when opposi-
tion began in the mid-1970s. Starting in 1972,
the Center Party adopted a platform that
nuclear power was both “dangerous” and
“immoral” (Lofstedt, p. 1) due to an inherent
risk of disaster and inability to dispose of
nuclear waste. This stance proved popular with
both rural voters and the environmentally-
minded urban middle class, and by 1976 the
Center Party had gained control of Parliament. 
Afraid of losing further power to the
Center Party, it was the Social Democrats who
proposed the nuclear power referendum of
1980. Held in March of that year, the non-bind-
ing referendum included the following three
alternatives:
1. Continue construction of plants cur-
rently being built; phase out all plants
at the end of their useful lifetimes,
approximately 2010. Allow no new con-
struction. 
2. Same as Option 1, but phaseout con-
tingent upon first securing replacement
power sources.
3. Cease construction of unfinished plants.
Phase out all plants by 1990.
The results of the referendum were as follows:
Alternative 1 received 18.9 percent of the vote,
while alternatives 2 and 3 received 39.1 percent
and 38.7 percent, respectively. It is of note that
3.3 percent of voting Swedes cast blank ballots,
and only 76 percent of eligible voters partici-
pated in the referendum. (Nordhaus, p. 35)
Additionally, none of the three options allowed
for the expansion of the nuclear power system.
This fact alone would seem to invalidate the ref-
erendum results for lack of a “pro-nuclear”
alternative. Despite limited choices and a clear-
ly undecided electorate, the Swedish govern-
ment accepted the referendum as a moral man-
date to plan for an eventual phasing out of
nuclear power as an energy source. 
Progress towards fulfilling the results of
the referendum has been painfully slow and rid-
dled with controversy. New energy bills passed
in 1991 and 1997 have voiced continued inten-
tions for a nuclear phaseout but have also
emphasized the importance of curbing green-
house gas emissions. In 1993 the independent
Energy Commission was created to study the
effects of a nuclear phaseout. The Commission
determined that it might be feasible to close up
to four of Sweden’s twelve nuclear power reac-
tors by the year 2010, but that the closure of all
reactors would carry “grave repercussions” for
Sweden’s economy. (Lofstedt, p. 2) 
After months of delay, the first successful
closure of a nuclear reactor finally took place
at the Bärseback 1 reactor in southern Sweden
in November of 1999. The Danish government
had been placing political pressure on the
Bärseback reactors because of their proximity
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to the Danish capital of Copenhagen, which lay
just across the Öresund from the nuclear facil-
ity. The Swedish government favored the choice
because the plant’s relatively small 600 MW size
would make acquiring replacement power com-
paratively easy, relative to the shutdown of one
of Sweden’s larger plants. The Swedish govern-
ment was forced to compensate Sydkraft,
Bärseback’s private owner, by granting it par-
tial ownership of the Ringhals plants and allow-
ing power production at these plants to be
increased. Following the closure of Bärseback
1, Bärseback 2 was scheduled for closure first
in July 2001, and later by December 2003.
These two dates have since come and gone, and
Bärseback 2 remains in full operation. Sydkraft
would like to see operation of the plant contin-
ue through 2017. (Lofstedt, p. 2)
The extent to which public opinion on the
nuclear power issue has changed over the past
two decades is astonishing. The most recent
poll, conducted in December 2003, found that
the top environmental priorities of Swedes
included curbing greenhouse gas emissions 
(74 percent of voters) and protecting unspoiled
rivers from further hydroelectric development
(15 percent). Only 7 percent considered the
nuclear power issue a top concern. If a new ref-
erendum were to be held today, only 14 percent
of Swedes would continue to favor a nuclear
phaseout. In total, 84 percent of Swedes could
be considered “pro-nuclear”; their stances on
the issue are as follows:
• Thirty-three percent support continuing
operation of existent nuclear plants to
the end of their useful lives.
• Another 33 percent support continuing
operation plus performing retrofitting
and upgrades to extend the lives of exist-
ing plants. 
• Eighteen percent support expanding
Sweden’s nuclear power infrastructure
by constructing additional nuclear facil-
ities. (UIC)
Economic Trends in Energy
Consumption
Due to a unique combination of climate,
industrial presence and government regulato-
ry policy, energy consumption trends in Sweden
differ considerably from those of other devel-
oped nations. Compared with Europe and other
industrialized nations, Sweden’s overall energy
consumption per capita is actually one of the
highest in the world, with consumption exceed-
ing 16,000 kWh per person per year. By con-
trast, the OECD average is less than 8,000 kWh,
and the EU average is just over 6,000 kWh.
(Bergman, p. 132) Sweden’s large energy
requirements are largely the result of three 
factors:  A northern climate means that much
electricity is required to provide light and heat
during Sweden’s long dark winters. Energy-
intensive industries provide the backbone of
Sweden’s industrial sector. Finally, a sparsely-
populated, broad geographic expanse results in
large energy requirements for the transporta-
tion sector.
A reliable supply of inexpensive power has
been the operational basis for many of Sweden’s
most important national industries. Industries
such as forestry, paper and pulp processing, and
mining make use of Sweden’s abundant natur-
al resources, but processing requires large
amounts of electricity to create a finished prod-
uct. These industries are invaluable to Sweden
in terms of both economic production 
and employment. Together, such industry pro-
duces $48.5 billion per year, or 30 percent of
Sweden’s gross domestic product. (“Sweden in
Figures…,” p. 64) At the same time, they pro-
vide nearly one million jobs. (“Sweden in
Figures…,” p. 58) These industries find a com-
petitive advantage in Sweden, thanks to afford-
able electricity rates provided by cheap and
abundant hydroelectric and nuclear power.
They pay an affordable 3.5 cents per kilowatt-
hour for electricity (in 1993 U.S. dollars), one
of the lowest rates in the EU. By comparison,
industrial pre-tax electricity rates in France,
Germany, and the U.K. are 5.5, 8.3 and 6.7 cents
per kilowatt-hour, respectively. (Nordhaus, 
p. 29) Sweden nurtures these prized industries
further by levying no tax on industrial electri-
cal consumption of any kind. Energy derived
from biofuels actually receives a 25 percent 
subsidy. (BioFinance) This subsidy largely 
benefits paper producers, who, through the 
processing and combustion of their own waste,
have created a practically self-sustaining 
energy cycle. 
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In the residential and commercial sectors,
Sweden has encouraged conservation practices
through higher prices as its primary means of
regulation. Consumers pay a significantly high-
er rate for their electricity at 5.5 cents per kilo-
watt-hour. In addition, they are charged an
energy tax which brings the final cost of elec-
tricity closer to 8.2 cents per kilowatt-hour.
Although this tax rate is high in comparison to
other EU nations, the final cost of electricity to
Swedish homes and businesses still remains far
below what residents of France, Germany, Italy,
or the U.K. might expect to pay. In these
nations, electricity costs range from 11 to 17
cents per kilowatt-hour. (Nordhaus, p. 29)
Sweden and Europe: Trading
Electricity
Over the past decade, many of the electri-
cal utilities in Sweden and throughout Europe
have become privatized and deregulated, and
the European power grid has become increas-
ingly interconnected. As nations begin to
import or export larger and larger shares of
electricity, the effects of market forces on elec-
tricity production are becoming more pro-
nounced. As a result of its efficient system of
hydroelectric and nuclear power production,
Sweden became a net electricity exporter dur-
ing the 1990s. By 1998 Sweden was exporting
10.7 tWh of electricity, or about 7 percent of its
total generation. (Bergman, p. 151) The closure
of Bärseback 1 in 1999, however, left Sweden
with an approximately 4 tWh energy deficit, and
it became necessary to import electricity to
make up the difference. Economically, Sweden
was hurt because it was forced to pay higher
market prices for energy it could produce more
cheaply and efficiently on its own. Perhaps the
greater irony, however, is the harsh environ-
mental reality of the situation:  Sweden is now
paying to import electricity produced at coal-
fired power plants in Denmark or newly con-
structed nuclear plants in Finland. (Lofstedt, p.
3) Sweden’s push to phase out nuclear power at
home is directly responsible for increased use
of fossil and nuclear fuels by its European
neighbors. Because Sweden’s national carbon
budget does not include emissions on electric-
ity produced abroad, the nuclear phaseout still
looks good on paper. Dirtier air in southern
Sweden and accelerating global warming, how-
ever, offer a harsher reality.
Nuclear Waste
Despite economic and environmental sta-
tistics which seem to favor nuclear power pro-
duction, several key arguments against it still
exist. In recent times, the most significant of
these has been the lack of a reliable means of
disposal for high-level radioactive waste gener-
ated during power production. An ongoing
effort to create a permanent waste repository,
however, should help ensure that this criticism
becomes dispelled. The Swedish Nuclear Fuel
and Waste Management Company, or SKB
(Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB), has been
contracted by the government to spearhead this
effort. A private company, the SKB manages the
disposal of all nuclear-type waste ranging from
medical and industrial refuse to spent nuclear
fuel. (SKB)
The operation of Sweden’s nuclear reac-
tors produces over 200 tons of high-level
radioactive waste per year. Waste from all
nuclear power facilities is transported by sea to
the Oskarshamns power station on Sweden’s
southeast coast. Here, a storage facility known
as the CLAB provides intermediate-term stor-
age. At the CLAB, high-level reactor waste is
stored in underground pools for a period of 30
to 40 years. During this period, the waste is
allowed to shed initially high levels of heat pro-
duced as a result of the radioactive decay
process. The CLAB, which has the capacity to
hold up to 5,000 tons of nuclear waste, is
expected to be filled by the end of 2004. A sec-
ond cavern of pools, currently under construc-
tion, should add an additional 3,000 ton stor-
age capacity to the facility, extending its useful
life to 2010. (SKB)
SKB is currently making plans for the
long-term permanent storage of nuclear waste
in deep underground repositories. In such facil-
ities, high-level waste will be stored at depths
ranging from 500 to 1000 meters. Waste will be
encapsulated in copper cylinders and placed in
caverns carved from the nearly two-billion-year-
old granite bedrock. A bentonite clay lining
would ensure that waste would remain isolat-
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ed from groundwater flowing through fractures
in the rock. (SKB) 
Two potential sites for the final repository
are currently being explored: one is located on
the Simpevarp Peninsula near the Oskarshamns
nuclear plants, and the second is located near
the Forsmark nuclear facility in Uppsala
County, north of Stockholm. Initial site inves-
tigations, which began in 1999, have involved
test drilling, environmental impact assess-
ments, and consultation with local citizens and
municipalities. Site conditions appear promis-
ing, being described as “meet[ing] the regula-
tory authorities’ safety requirements with
ample margin” in SKB’s SR-97 safety assess-
ment. The report goes on to say: “It is com-
pletely feasible to build a safe deep repository
on these sites.” (SKB) Initial investigations
should be concluded by the end of 2004, and
complete site investigations and construction
lasting 6 to 10 years will commence thereafter.
The completed repository should be ready to
begin accepting waste by the early 2010s. (SKB)
Nuclear Safety
Like nuclear waste disposal, nuclear safe-
ty is another issue which prompts many Swedes
to question the prudence of nuclear power. At
the time of the 1980 Referendum, concerns
regarding the overall safety of nuclear power
were likely a leading factor prompting Swedes
to favor a nuclear phaseout. The nuclear power
industry was relatively young at the time, and
the near-meltdown at Three Mile Island in the
U.S. which had occurred less than a year earli-
er made many wonder whether a potentially
catastrophic accident could occur at one of
Sweden’s nuclear plants.
The following decades, however, have
proven the performance of Sweden’s nuclear
reactors to be enviably safe. None of Sweden’s
nuclear plants has ever experienced a severe
core melt, and the SKI — Sweden’s nuclear reg-
ulatory agency — estimates that the probabil-
ity of such an event is less than one in 100,000.
In terms of routine operation, collective radia-
tion exposures from Swedish plants average 40
percent less than the world average. (Nordhaus, 
p. 97) The greatest nuclear threat that Sweden
faces likely comes from plants operating in
neighboring countries. Several Chernobyl-class
graphite reactors, such as the Ignalina plant in
nearby Lithuania, are still operating in former
Soviet-bloc states. (Lofstedt, p. 5) These plants
are inherently less safe than those built using
Swedish technology, and fallout from a disaster
at one of these plants could easily impact
Sweden. Ironically, if Sweden is to continue
phasing out nuclear power, it will likely begin
importing electricity produced in part by these
potentially dangerous foreign facilities to meet
its domestic power needs.
Alternative Energy Outlook
If Sweden follows through with a phase-
out of nuclear power, alternative non-carbon
sources of energy must be researched, devel-
oped and implemented if Sweden is to meet its
present and future power needs. In its 2003
Energy Foresight Report, the Royal Academy of
Engineers (IVA) paints a picture of Swedish
society in the year 2050. In this idealistic sce-
nario, solar power and the hydrogen fuel cell
have become the basis for providing electricity
to power everything from industry to residences
to transportation. By this time, solar fuel cells
are forecast to have undergone enough tech-
nological improvement such that their cost and
production make them practical for widespread
use. Not only would the solar cells provide a
substantial share of traditional electricity, but
energy produced would be used to create hydro-
gen fuel by electrolyzing water. Hydrogen fuel
cells could then be used to power vehicles, elim-
inating the need for fossil fuels in the trans-
portation sector as well. Other renewable ener-
gy forms based on natural ecocycles, including
hydroelectric, wind and biofuels, would play an
important role by helping to meet the remain-
der of electrical demand. (IVA)
Such an outlook appears idealistic to say
the least. Even if the technological advances of
the next 45 years are sufficient to make such a
scenario plausible, however, implementing such
a system will require a major overhaul in tech-
nology and infrastructure at all levels of
Swedish society. Nonetheless, advances are well
under way in several key areas which the
Academy considers “bridges” to this self-sus-
taining energy system of the future. Specifically,
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researchers are concentrating on biofuels, wind
power and natural gas. (IVA)
Biofuels are currently the most widely-
used alternative fuel sources in Sweden. The
majority of biofuels today are wood-based,
derived primarily from waste created as a
byproduct of the forestry and paper industries.
The waste is processed into combustible pellets
which can be burned in a controlled fashion to
obtain energy. This natural fuel source is con-
sumed at a variety of levels. On the small scale,
the wooden pellets can be burned in woodstoves
at private residences to provide heat to homes
and businesses; this practice is common in
rural areas. In more urbanized zones, the fuel
is combusted en masse at a CHP (Combined
Heat and Power) thermal power plant. Not only
does the plant generate electricity through use
of a steam turbine, but the resultant hot water
is pumped through homes and buildings to cre-
ate blocks of district heating. In this way, it is
estimated that biofuels provide Sweden with as
much as 92 tWh of energy per year, a quantity
of energy nearly 30 percent greater than the
amount of electricity produced by either
nuclear or hydroelectric power. (Bergman, p.
148) Recent work in genetic engineering has
created prospects for fast growing, high-fiber
varieties of plants which could be cultivated and
harvested for the specific purpose of combus-
tion as biofuels. Additional advances in the use
of organically derived methanol and ethanol as
biofuels in the transportation sector also hold
future promise. (IVA, p. 8)
It is of note that the combustion of bio-
fuels does produce carbon dioxide gas. Such
emissions, however, are reabsorbed when new
forests are replanted to replace harvested trees.
Thus, the system is in equilibrium, and there is
no net increase of carbon dioxide in the atmos-
phere. Combustion of fossil fuels, on the other
hand, releases geologically “old” carbon
sequestered hundreds of millions of years ago
and confined in rock layers deep below the
earth.
Wind power in Sweden contributes a mere
0.3 percent of Sweden’s total annual electricity
generation. (Bergman, p. 151) Compared to
neighboring nations such as Denmark, which
receives 12 percent of its annual production
from wind power, this number is rather small.
(Helby) Nevertheless, the wind power industry
in Sweden is expanding. In the past seven years,
the number of wind turbines in Sweden has
more than doubled, from 300 in 1996 to 631 in
2003. Due to increases in the size and efficien-
cy of new turbines, electrical output during this
same period more than tripled from 0.15 to 
0.50 tWh of electricity per year. The Swedish
government has established the goal of imple-
menting 10 tWh of annual wind power genera-
tion capacity by the year 2015. (Lund) Despite
its appeal as a clean and renewable energy
source, wind power carries several drawbacks.
Accounting for capital costs, wind power is 
10 to 30 percent more expensive to produce
than traditional thermal power. (Helby)
Therefore, it must depend on subsidies from the
Swedish government to maintain its economic
viability. An additional drawback of wind tur-
bines is their tendency to spoil the aesthetics of
scenic mountainous or coastal landscapes.
Unfortunately, some of the windiest regions of
Sweden are also the most valued as natural or
recreational havens, causing wind turbines to
draw public opposition. (Lofstedt, p. 4)
Despite being a fossil fuel, natural gas
holds great promise as a “bridge” fuel to carry
Sweden into the solar-hydrogen era. Natural gas
is clean-burning when compared to oil or coal,
and its market price makes it competitive with
nuclear and hydroelectric power. Natural gas
also has the advantage that it can be burned in
smaller scale CHP plants close to population
centers, thus eliminating long electric trans-
mission distances and simultaneously fueling
district heating blocks. Sweden currently
obtains approximately 9 tWh of energy per year
from the combustion of natural gas. (Bergman,
p. 148) This figure is expected to increase dra-
matically beginning in 2008 or 2009, upon the
completion of the Mid-Nordic Gas Pipeline.
Once completed, the pipeline will run from the
Norwegian offshore oil fields, across central
Sweden, beneath the Baltic Sea and across
Finland to the Russian border. Although
Sweden itself has no gas reserves, the pipeline
will supply Sweden with natural gas extracted
from both Norwegian and Russian fields.
(Guomundsson) 
The greatest disadvantage of natural gas
as an energy source is the carbon dioxide which
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results from the combustion process. In a stan-
dard power plant, this gas would be released
into the atmosphere, where it would contribute
to global warming. New sequestration technol-
ogy, however, allows carbon dioxide emissions
to be separated, captured and stored. Carbon
dioxide is then injected deep underground for
permanent storage in appropriate geologic for-
mations. Carbon dioxide injection is currently
being practiced in Sweden on a limited basis.
Over the past ten years, the cost of this proce-
dure has decreased dramatically, from nearly
€100 per ton to less than €30 per ton. Further
technological improvements could decrease the
cost even further. (IVA, p. 15)
A second disadvantage of natural gas is its
finite supply. Because natural gas is a non-
renewable resource, supplies will eventually
dwindle and its use will become less economi-
cal. When this occurs, however, it is thought
that the transition to a hydrogen-based fuel
cycle will be well underway. The existent gas
infrastructure could then be converted to a
hydrogen distribution system with relative ease. 
Conclusions
The time has come for Sweden to seriously
reevaluate its decision to phase out domestic
nuclear power production. The scientific dis-
coveries and technological advances of the past
twenty-four years have largely discredited any
argument for the elimination of nuclear power.
As an energy source, nuclear energy has 
continually proven to be reliable, safe and 
economically sound. Even nuclear waste, 
which many considered to be the final 
unresolved drawback of nuclear energy gener-
ation, will soon find a permanent home in 
deep geologic repositories. As nations across
Europe continue to expand their nuclear power
capacity, Sweden should see that a nuclear
phaseout is, in today’s world, a clear step back-
wards. 
In the years since 1980, the greenhouse
effect has taken center-stage as the most press-
ing environmental issue faced by today’s soci-
ety. Swedes have recognized this fact, and
Sweden as a nation has made great strides in
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Sweden
deserves commendation for its energy conser-
vation measures, as well as research and devel-
opment of alternative and renewable fuel
sources. Such measures, however, can only
carry Sweden’s energy supply so far.
Sweden now finds itself at a crossroads.
The nation needs affordable and reliable ener-
gy to grow and prosper, but is nuclear power or
fossil fuel the lesser of the two evils? Sweden
must look beyond history, politics and a thick-
ening veil of carbon-dioxide to see that nuclear
power is clearly the better choice.
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